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Medicaid work requirements are a relatively new policy, coming into effect January 
2018. While the current literature focuses on coverage loss for Medicaid recipients, this 
honor thesis examines the impacts of implementing Medicaid work requirements in 
North Carolina. I examine the effects of Medicaid work requirements on payer mix, 
operating margins, and uncompensated care costs of Disproportionate-Share Hospitals in 
North Carolina. Using a quantitative approach with hospital data from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, this study concludes that work requirements 
significantly impacts payer mix, operating margins, and uncompensated care costs. The 
results indicate that work requirements could decrease the Medicaid payer mix by 2% at 
hospitals. Additionally, my research suggests that operating margins improve between 
1.8% and 2.0% while uncompensated care costs increase between 3.3% and 3.4%. The 
results indicate that while hospital margins could improve with work requirements, the 
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A significant change in Medicaid policy occurred in January 2018 when the 
federal government began allowing states to impose work requirements on Medicaid 
recipients. North Carolina was one of several more states that has considered filing an 
application with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) for the approval 
of Medicaid work requirements. On March 27, 2019, the North Carolina Senate filed a 
bill titled “Medicaid Work and Community Engagement Opp.” (NC Senate Bill 387). If 
passed, Senate Bill 387 would implement work reporting requirements for ‘able-bodied’ 
adults who receive Medicaid health benefits (North Carolina General Assembly, Senate 
Bill 387, 2019). Senate Bill 387 would require current North Carolina Medicaid 
recipients to work or perform community service for a certain number of hours per week 
in order to retain their Medicaid benefits (Boughton, 2019).  If the North Carolina 
legislature sends a waiver request to CMS, the impacts of these changes would expand 
beyond just Medicaid coverage and have downstream consequences on hospitals. This 
thesis aims to understand how a change in Medicaid work requirements would affect the 
payer mix, operating margins, and uncompensated care costs of Disproportionate-Share 











 In this literature review, I first provide a background of the Medicaid program that 
is important for contextualizing my research. Then, I outline current research which 
studies the effects Medicaid expansion has on state economies, coverage rates, labor 
participation, and hospital finances. Next, I discuss the body of research that examines 
the effects of work requirements on means-tested programs1, such as the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program and Medicaid. Finally, I conclude this literature review by 
considering the gaps in the current literature and describing how this research contributes 
to the conversation about Medicaid work requirements.  
 
Background of the Medicaid Program 
In this section, I will discuss the history of Medicaid, the structure of the program, 
and critical recent changes to the program. Together, these sections provide a 
foundational knowledge of Medicaid, which is necessary for understanding my research. 
The Medicaid program: from origins to present day 
From its humble beginnings a little over fifty years ago, Medicaid has evolved 
from a footnote in healthcare to the nation’s most extensive healthcare program. 
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicaid and Medicare into law as a part of the 
Social Security Amendments of 1965. A child of President Johnson’s “Great Society 
Programs,” Medicaid sought to provide medical care to low-income individuals and 
families. Since its implementation in 1965, Medicaid has become the largest means-
 
1 A means-tested program, such as Medicaid, is a program that uses individual income or poverty 
guidelines as criteria for eligibility. Government agencies set different thresholds on individual income or 





tested transfer program in the United States, in both the number of participants and total 
costs (Buchmueller, Ham, & Shore-Sheppard, 2015; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, 2019b). According to CMS, around one in five Americans, or 66 million 
people, were enrolled in Medicaid in 2019. Federal spending for Medicaid reached $593 
billion in fiscal year 2018, and it accounted for two percent of Gross Domestic Product 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2019). Medicaid has grown from a small program at its 
inception to a fundamental part of the healthcare system.  
Federal-State structure of the Medicaid Program 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program responsible for providing medical 
coverage to low-income individuals and families. State participation in Medicaid is 
voluntary for all states, the District of Columbia (DC), and American territories 
(Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2019a). The federal government 
provides a large majority of the funding for Medicaid and sets requirements for 
eligibility, services that states must cover, and reimbursement rates (Buchmueller, Ham, 
& Shore-Sheppard, 2015). State Medicaid receives payments from the federal 
government at half or more of their costs for providing services to recipients (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019d). At the same time, states provide additional 
funding for Medicaid, and they maintain some flexibility with the program. Though states 
are subject to federal standards, they have considerable flexibility in terms of eligibility 
rules, the method and level of provider payments, and program benefits (Buchmueller, 
Ham, & Shore-Sheppard, 2015). More plainly, the Medicaid program combines federal 
mandates but allows states to select options about who is eligible for benefits and what 





Medicaid, significant variations exist between state Medicaid programs (Bitler & 
Zavodny, 2014). Thus, scholars often argue that Medicaid is not a single program, but 51 
separate programs.  
While states have some control over determining eligibility, they are required to 
provide Medicaid and services to four federally recognized groups. The current Medicaid 
law covers the following groups of people: low-income families, pregnant women, 
people of all ages with disabilities, and individuals that need long-term care (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019c). To be eligible for Medicaid, an individual must 
meet the criteria set by the federal and state government. Tables 1-4  in the Appendix 
show the income and resource requirements set by the state of North Carolina to be 
eligible for Medicaid for different beneficiary groups (North Carolina Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2019). All states determine the final income thresholds for 
Medicaid, but they are still subject to minimum and maximum thresholds set by the 
federal government (Bitler & Zavodny, 2014). 
Medicaid is seen as an exemplary model of federalism and shared power between 
the federal and state governments. Broad federal mandates and state flexibility with the 
Medicaid program have created a patchwork of Medicaid programs in which no state’s 
program is structured exactly alike.  
The ACA and Section 1115: two critical changes to the Medicaid program 
The Patient Affordable Care Act (ACA) and Section 1115 waivers of the Social 
Security Act are two major critical changes that significantly modified the Medicaid 
program. These two policies made considerable alterations to eligibility requirements, 





Signed into law in 2010, the ACA aimed to increase insurance coverage and 
reduce the rate of uninsured individuals.  A key component of the ACA allowed states to 
voluntarily expand Medicaid to cover more low-income Americans (Camilleri, 2017). 
Under the ACA, Medicaid eligibility could be extended to adults with incomes up to 138 
percent of the federal poverty level, with the promise of increased federal funding for 
expanded coverage (Camilleri, 2017). North Carolina is one of 14 states that opted out of 
Medicaid expansion under the ACA, and Table 5 in the Appendix shows state decisions 
to participate in expansions (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2019). Although lawmakers 
designed the ACA to expand access to healthcare for as many individuals as possible, 
states still had the discretion of who to cover and what benefits individuals were entitled 
to receive.  
Another significant change to Medicaid came in 2018 when CMS revised the 
criteria for Section 1115 waivers. Under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) can waive certain requirements of 
Medicaid. The waivers permit states to use federal Medicaid funds in alternative ways if 
HHS determines that the state will use the funds to promote the objectives of the 
Medicaid program (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2019a). In January 2018, 
CMS issued new guidelines for Section 1115 waivers, which gave states the discretion to 
impose work requirements in Medicaid as a condition of eligibility (Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services, 2018). CMS granted ten states waivers—Arizona, Arkansas, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Utah, and Wisconsin—to 
adopt work and community engagement requirements (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and 





elderly, and non-pregnant individuals to meet work and community engagement 
requirements for Medicaid eligibility. State Section 1115 waivers have some common 
features, but they vary with regards to: 
• which populations are required to participate in work or community engagement 
as a condition of eligibility, and within those populations, which individuals 
qualify for an exception to the requirement; 
 
• activities that qualify as work or community engagement, and the number of 
hours beneficiaries are required to complete; and  
 
• the penalties for non-compliance (pg. 2) 
 
 
Most states with approved waivers opted to expand Medicaid under the ACA, and the 
work requirements they adopted applies to their expansion population. CMS approved 
work and community engagement requirements for two non-expansion states, South 
Carolina and Wisconsin (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2019a).  
 The ACA and Section 1115 waivers dramatically changed the Medicaid program. 
The ACA offered states the opportunity to expand their contributions to the Medicaid 
program and provide more coverage to individuals. Alternatively, Section 1115 waivers 
approved by the Secretary of HHS allow states to enact requirements as a condition of 
eligibility. These two changes have given states more autonomy, discretion, and power 
over their Medicaid programs and whom they decide to cover.  
 
Effects of Medicaid Expansion 
 In this section of my literature review, I review the bodies of research that 
examine the effects of Medicaid expansion. Since Medicaid work requirements are such a 





However, I believe that understanding the impacts of Medicaid expansion will illuminate 
my topic and research about work requirements. I will examine the effects Medicaid has 
on state economies, coverage, labor, and hospitals.  
Effects of Medicaid Expansion on State Economies 
 A substantial body of research found two main economic benefits to states 
through Medicaid expansion, including state budget savings and tax revenue gains. First, 
multiple studies suggest that expansion can result in state budget savings through 
offsetting state costs in other areas. Research by Ayanian, Ehrlich, Grimes, and Levy 
(2017) linked Medicaid expansion to positive economic impacts in Michigan. Ayanian et 
al. (2017) found that Michigan experienced reduced state spending on services covered 
by Medicaid expansion, such as state mental health and correctional health programs, for 
adults who were previously ineligible for Medicaid. The authors calculated that due to 
Medicaid expansion, Michigan saved around $235 million annually (pg. 409). Additional 
studies conducted in Colorado, Montana, and Louisiana showed state budgetary savings 
due to Medicaid expansion offsetting the costs of various state health programs (Brown, 
Fisher, & Resnick, 2016; Richardson, Llorens, & Heidelberg, 2018; Ward & Bridge, 
2019). Research across several different Medicaid expansion states concluded that 
Medicaid expansion has net positive impacts on states’ budgets.  
 In addition to state budget savings, research suggests that states also see revenue 
gains from Medicaid expansion. Studies conducted in several states, including Colorado, 
Michigan, Montana, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania, show that Medicaid expansion 
positively benefits the state economy (Richardson, Llorens, & Heidelberg, 2018). A study 





Medicaid led to an increase in state tax revenues of $53.4 million per year. Similarly, 
Ayanian et al. (2017) found that Medicaid expansion in Michigan will add approximately 
$145 million to $153 million annually in new state tax revenue. Three main factors that 
contributed to increased state tax revenues were: the higher federal pay rates for 
Medicaid populations after expansion, additional revenue from taxes on managed care 
organizations, and a decrease in state disproportionate share payments to hospitals as the 
number of uninsured individuals decreased (Ayanian, Ehrlich, Grimes, & Levy, 2017; 
Richardson, Llorens, & Heidelberg, 2018). The current research converges on the same 
idea: Medicaid expansion bolsters state economies through budget savings and new tax 
revenues. 
Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Coverage 
 Substantial research conducted on health insurance coverage after expansion 
showed two main things – sizable coverage gains after implementation expansion and a 
compromise in coverage gains due to state waivers. Most all research surrounding 
Medicaid expansion reports that states experience coverage gains, reductions in 
uninsured rates, and positive externalities, such as spillover effects, after implementation 
(Courtemanche, et al., 2018; Kaestner, Garrett, Chen, Gangopadhyaya, & Fleming, 2017; 
Soni, Hendryx, & Simon, 2017; Sommers, Blendon, Orav, & Epstein, 2016; Callison & 
Sicilian, 2016). Additionally, several studies found that after states fully implemented 
Medicaid expansions, the coverage gap across income groups, racial groups, marital 
status, and age-groups, decreased significantly (Courtemanche, et al., 2018; Wehby & 
Lyu, 2017). Wehby and Lyu (2017) observed that newly eligible adults under Medicaid 





claim that legislation had an important spillover effect, also known as the “welcome mat 
effect,” which in turn increased enrollment. The welcome mat effect occurs when an 
expansion of a public program encourages individuals who were previously eligible for 
the program, but yet not enrolled, to now sign-up for the program. Hudson and Moriya 
(2017) find that Medicaid expansions increased coverage for children whose parents 
gained eligibility under the expansions by 5.7 percent. 
However, a growing body of research suggests that Section 1115 waivers that 
target the expansion population cause coverage losses and may impact healthcare access. 
Several researchers studied Indiana’s waiver, the Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0, to determine 
its impacts on coverage gains. One study conducted by Freedman, Richardson, and 
Simon (2018), found that Indiana’s coverage gains were smaller than the gains in 
expansion states. Coverage in Indiana grew by about 3 percent with Medicaid expansion 
and the waiver in place, compared to about 4 percent for expansion states. Another study 
by Sommers, Fry, Blendon, and Epstein (2018) similarly concluded that coverage rates 
were significantly higher in expansion states than in Indiana. Sommers et al. (2018) also 
assert the waiver program led to less affordable healthcare in Indiana than in expansion 
states. The findings from these two studies suggest that Medicaid expansion interventions 
may lead to unintended consequences for coverage and access.  
Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Labor 
 Another body of research examines how Medicaid expansion affects the labor 
participation and employment, with the evidence being somewhat mixed. Some studies 
find that increased expansion correlates to increased employment, but other studies 





One body of research observed increased employment as a result of expansion. 
Economic theory predicts that social programs with income-based eligibility will create 
positive behavioral responses to work effort (Dasgupta & Debraj, 1986; Banerjee, Hanna, 
Kreindler, & Olken, 2016). In other words, economic theory suggests that social 
programs like Medicaid can provide workers with a basic enough living standard to be 
productive workers. Ward and Bridge (2019) corroborate this economic theory in their 
study regarding the impacts of Medicaid expansion in Montana. The authors observed a 
1.3% increase in employment in Montana after Medicaid expansion (Ward & Bridge, 
2019). Furthermore, a multi-state study found that after the ACA, individuals living in 
expansion states were significantly more likely to be employed than those in non-
expansion states (Hall, Shartzer, Kurth, & Thomas, 2017). The study also observed that 
individuals in expansion states are 6% less likely to be unemployed due to a disability 
compared to those in non-expansion states (pg. 263).  
Another stream of research found that Medicaid expansions do not significantly 
affect employment or labor participation. Callison and Sicilian (2016) examined 
Medicaid expansions and how they affect individual labor market participation by race 
and ethnicity. The authors found that Medicaid expansions do not lead to increased labor 
force participation or employment for African American or Hispanic men or women after 
Medicaid expansions (pg. 318). However, the same study observed that labor market 
participation improved for white men and women after Medicaid expansions (pg. 318). 
Work by Kaestner, Garrett, Chen, Gangopadhyaya, and Fleming (2017) similarly 
concluded that expanded Medicaid does not lead to increased labor force participation or 





Medicaid expansion on the insurance coverage and labor supply of low-income and low-
educated adults. While the authors found that the number of uninsured adults decreased 
with Medicaid expansion, the effects on labor supply are statistically insignificant (pg. 
631).  
One reason the research on labor participation and employment diverged is 
because studies measured different Medicaid populations. Ward & Bridge (2019), who 
observed positive effects in employment, controlled their regression analysis for the state, 
year, total population, population over age 65, population with a disability, population 
over age 25 with at least a bachelor’s degree, and total employment in the traded sector. 
Additionally, Hall et al. (2017) used difference-in-difference testing to assess 
employment for adults with disabilities. On the other hand, Callison & Sicilian (2016), 
who found no statistical difference in employment, used race and ethnicity as a measure 
while Kaestner et al. (2017) observed the effects for low-income and low-educated 
adults.  
Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Hospitals 
 Another stream of work in the Medicaid literature indicates that expansions 
improve hospital operating margins and overall financial performance for a variety of 
hospitals, including DSHs. Current research links improved financial performance and 
reductions in hospital closures to Medicaid expansions. Most recently, Rhodes, 
Buchmueller, Levy, and Nikpay (2019) report that Medicaid expansion leads to a 
decrease in uncompensated care costs and an increase in average operating margins. 
Specifically, the authors observed a 1.5 percent decrease in uncompensated care costs and 





89). Additionally, operating margins improved significantly for public hospitals and rural 
hospitals after expansion (pg. 89). Although a few years older than the work by Rhodes et 
al., Balvin (2016) and Dranove, Garthwaite, and Ody (2016) find comparable decreases 
in uncompensated care costs and increases in operating margins. Lindrooth, Perraillon, 
Hardy, and Tung (2018) showed that hospitals in states with Medicaid expansion 
experienced lower rates of closure than in non-expansion states. Further, the authors 
showed that hospitals have stronger financial performance, with improved hospital 
margins of about 33 percent in expansion states (Lindrooth, Perraillon, Hardy, & Tung, 
2018). From a different perspective, Bai and Anderson (2016) provide additional 
evidence supporting the finding that Medicaid expansions improve hospitals’ financial 
standings. Bai and Anderson (2016) observed that expansions reduced bad-debt expenses 
and enhanced hospitals’ financial strength.  
 A subset of the hospital financial literature focuses specifically on DSHs. To 
investigate how hospitals would react to Medicaid expansions and cuts, Cole, Walker, 
Mora, and Diana (2014) evaluated hospitals’ financial strength in expansion and non-
expansion states. The authors found that hospitals in non-expansion states face greater 
financial stress than hospitals in expansion states (Cole, Walker, Mora, & Diana, 2014). 
Of the hospitals in non-expansion states examined by Cole et al. (2014), 42.5% of them 
were in a weakened financial position due to Medicaid funding cuts. In a study to assess 
the impact of Medicaid expansion on DSH providers, Camilleri (2017) finds that 
Medicaid expansion reduced uncompensated care costs by 35% for DSHs. The findings 
by Cole et al. (2014) and Camilleri (2017) on DSHs are consistent with the larger body of 





Work Requirements in Means-Tested Programs 
 This section of the literature review discusses the research about work 
requirements in two means-tested programs, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP)2 and Medicaid.  
Effects of SNAP Work Requirements  
One branch of research attempts to understand the connection between SNAP 
work requirements and program participation. Ku, Brantley, and Pillai (2019) 
investigated data from over 2,000 United States counties from 2013 to 2017 and assessed 
the impact work requirements had on SNAP beneficiaries. Results from this study 
indicated that work requirements reduced total SNAP participation and caused more than 
one-third of SNAP participants without dependents to lose benefits (pg. 1449) 
Additionally, the authors reported that states which implemented work requirements saw 
a reduction of about $2.5 billion in federal SNAP benefits (pg. 1449). Other research by 
Stacy, Scherpf, and Jo (2018) suggests a decline in program participation with work 
requirements in place, and the authors observed a reduction of 3.1% in SNAP 
participation for adults with no dependents. The study also noted stronger impacts for 
participants in high unemployment areas and those with a high school education or less 
(Stacy, Scherpf, & Jo, 2018).  
 
2 The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is a means-tested program run by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). As defined by the USDA, “SNAP provides nutrition benefits to 
supplement the food budget of needy families so they can purchase healthy food and move towards self-
sufficiency.” To be eligible for SNAP, individuals must apply to the program in the state in which they live 





Effects of Medicaid Work Requirements 
Another branch of research explored Medicaid work requirements and their 
impact on coverage and hospitals’ finances. Arkansas was the first state to receive a 
Section 1115 waiver to implement Medicaid work requirements as a condition of 
eligibility, so current research assesses the impact of Medicaid work requirements in 
Arkansas. Sommers, Goldman, Blendon, Orav, and Epstein (2019), studied the changes 
in insurance coverage and employment within the first year of work requirement 
implementation in Arkansas. Through surveys, the authors found that work requirements 
in Arkansas decreased Medicaid coverage by 13.2% and increased the uninsured rate by 
4% (pg.1075). Although work requirements were associated with significant losses in 
health insurance coverage, Sommers et al. (2019) didn’t observe any significant change 
in employment or labor participation. This study was limited by its lower response rate 
than that of government surveys. Additionally, the Arkansas Department of Human 
services calculated that in the first 6 months of implementation, 25% of beneficiaries lost 
coverage (Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2018). Kentucky, a state currently in 
the process of petitioning for a Section 1115 waiver, forecasted that around 15% of the 
state’s Medicaid population would lose coverage under the proposed work requirements 
law (Office of the Governor of Kentucky, 2017).  
From a different perspective, Haught, Dobson, and Luu (2019) researched the 
effects that implementing work requirements has on hospital finances in Arkansas. 
Findings from the study suggest that Medicaid work requirements could harm hospitals’ 
financial positions, with hospitals seeing a 10 to 11% reduction in revenues as a result of 





work requirements in means-tested programs is limited, it suggests work requirements 
have negative impacts on program participation and downstream effects on providers.  
 
Goals for this Research 
My question is important because I address the downstream effects of Medicaid 
work requirements – an area that researchers have not fully explored. While there is 
significant research regarding Medicaid expansion and its financial impacts on hospitals, 
current research is only beginning to explore the effects of Medicaid restrictions. My 
research addresses a gap in the current literature by reframing the debate to examine the 
implications of Medicaid restrictions. Overall, this research seeks to contribute new 
insights to the Medicaid work requirements debate by exploring the business implications 









In this section of the thesis, I explain my question and hypotheses and the 
methods I used to analyze my research question. In particular, I outline my research 
question and hypotheses, define DSH providers and payments, explain uncompensated 
care costs, describe the baseline data used to assess hospitals’ financials, explain how I 
forecasted Medicaid enrollment in North Carolina with work requirements, and measured 
the impact on operating margins and uncompensated care costs. To conclude the 
methodology section, I identify the limitations of my research design.  
 
Question & Hypotheses 
My research question attempts to answer how Medicaid work requirements will 
impact the payer mix, operating margins, and uncompensated care costs of 
Disproportionate Share Hospitals in North Carolina. My research question is needed 
because it reframes the debate, and it flips what researchers have been asking. Instead of 
looking at the effects of Medicaid expansion, I ask what the implications of Medicaid 
restriction are. Overall, this research seeks to contribute new insights to the Medicaid 
work requirements debate by exploring the business implications of the proposed policy 
changes. I have five hypotheses for my research, which are described below. 
First Hypothesis 
I first hypothesize that Medicaid work requirements will shift the payer mix by 
decreasing the percentage of Medicaid patients at hospitals and increasing the percentage 
of non-Medicaid patients. Scholars have extensively examined the shifts in payer mix 





number of uninsured discharges and increased the number of Medicaid discharges, with 
no significant changes in total discharges (Admon, et al., 2019; Martin, Hartman, 
Washington, & Catlin, 2017; Freedman, Nikpay, Carroll, & Simon, 2017; Sommers, 
Blendon, Orav, & Epstein, 2016). This research also suggests that Medicaid expansion 
increased the proportion of patients with Medicaid coverage and decreased the proportion 
of patients with private insurance (Admon, et al., 2019; Wu, et al., 2018; Nikpay, 
Buchmueller, & Levy, 2016). Much of the current research indicates that Medicaid 
beneficiaries experience ‘churning,’ or in other words, those who lose Medicaid coverage 
experience permanent coverage loss or significant gaps in their coverage (Haught, 
Dobson, & Luu, 2019; Garfield, Rudowitz, Orgera, & Damico, 2019).  
Considering these findings, I assume that Medicaid patients who lost coverage 
simply end up as uninsured patients. The number of discharges remains the same after 
work requirements, but the numerators of the Medicaid and uninsured change with work 
requirements. The number of Medicaid patients will decrease with discharges constant,  
and the number of uninsured patients will increase with discharges constant. Because of 
this, I hypothesize that Medicaid work requirements will decrease the proportion of 
Medicaid patients and increase the proportion of uninsured patients.  
Second Hypothesis 
Second, I hypothesize that Medicaid work requirements will reduce the Medicaid 
patient revenues and total net patient revenues as a result of the decrease in Medicaid 
patients. Haught, Dobson, and Luu (2019) researched the effects that implementing work 
requirements have on hospital finances in Arkansas. Findings from the study suggest that 





decrease in Medicaid patients and an increase in uninsured patients. Another body of 
research shows that hospitals saw revenues rise significantly due to fewer uninsured 
patients after Medicaid expansion (Rhodes, Buchmueller, Levy, & Nikpay, 2019; 
Camilleri, 2017). I hypothesize that due to payer shifts (explained in Hypothesis 1), 
revenues will decrease as work requirements move Medicaid patients from reimbursed 
patients to uninsured ones.  
Third Hypothesis 
Third, I hypothesize that hospitals’ costs will decrease. Hospital operating 
expenses (e.g., costs) are the total expenses incurred by a hospital for providing patient 
services to all patients. The cost to provide service to a Medicaid patient is the same as 
providing care for non-Medicaid patients (American Hospital Association, 2017). 
However, Medicaid only pays part of a Medicaid patient’s costs, 87 cents per dollar 
spent, and the hospital must absorb the costs that are not covered by Medicaid (American 
Hospital Association, 2017). I predict that a hospital’s operating costs will decrease 
because hospitals will have to treat fewer Medicaid patients after work requirements. 
Medicaid beneficiaries will be moved to uninsured patient status and their care will be 
acknowledged as uncompensated care costs, which is separate from a hospital’s operating 
margins.   
Fourth Hypothesis 
Fourth, I hypothesize the operating margins for hospitals will increase as a result 
of decreased revenues and decreased costs. I predict that the decrease in costs will be 
greater than the reduction in revenues, so operating margins for hospitals will improve. A 





hospitals lose money by providing services to Medicaid patients. Hospitals receive 87 
cents for every dollar spent providing services to Medicaid patients, with more than two-
thirds of hospitals receiving Medicaid payments less than the cost of delivering care 
(American Hospital Association, 2019). However, a Medicaid patient costs the same to 
treat as a non-Medicaid patient (American Hospital Association, 2017). In other words, it 
is more expensive for hospitals to provide services to Medicaid patients than the revenues 
they receive from them. While work requirements would cause hospitals to lose revenue 
from the displaced Medicaid patients, I predict hospitals’ costs would be reduced at a 
greater rate since hospitals would no longer have to cover the difference between 
Medicaid reimbursements and patient costs. As mentioned in the hypothesis below and 
the DSH uncompensated care costs section, I separate operating margins from 
uncompensated care costs. I assume that patients still seek medical care from hospitals 
but as uninsured patients, and therefore I do not factor those costs into operating margins.  
Fifth Hypothesis 
Lastly, I hypothesize that uncompensated care costs will increase due to Medicaid 
work requirements. Uncompensated care costs, which are a part of a hospital’s operating 
costs, are the health care or services hospitals provide that do not get reimbursed. Often, 
uncompensated care costs arise when people do not have insurance and cannot afford to 
pay the cost of care. Medicaid beneficiaries who lose coverage because of work 
requirements may be barred from reenrolling in the program for a certain period (Haught, 
Dobson, & Luu, 2019). Under the Arkansas law, if beneficiaries did not meet the work 
requirements, they would lose coverage for the remaining calendar year and have to 





(Haught, Dobson, & Luu, 2019). As a result of this lockout, large portions of recipients 
will be uninsured or have extended gaps in their coverage, which increases 
uncompensated care costs.  
Other research shows that Medicaid expansions reduces the uninsured rates at 
hospitals and uncompensated care costs, with larger decreases in uncompensated care 
costs at disproportionate-share hospitals (Rhodes, Buchmueller, Levy, & Nikpay, 2019; 
Admon, et al., 2019; Camilleri, 2017). On the other side, studies find that for states that 
did not expand Medicaid, uncompensated costs increased (Price & Eibner, 2013). 
Considering the research, I hypothesize that Medicaid work requirements will increase 
uncompensated care costs since individuals are moved from Medicaid to uninsured 
status.  
 
Disproportionate Share Hospitals & DSH Payments 
As defined by The Health Resources & Services Administration (2019), 
Disproportionate Share Hospitals (DSH) “…serve a significantly disproportionate 
number of low-income patients and receive payments from the Centers for Medicaid and 
Medicare Services to cover the costs of providing care to uninsured patients.” The goal of 
the DSH payments is to improve access for Medicaid and uninsured patients (Medicaid 
and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2019). First, states receive DSH payments 
from the federal government to offset DSH hospitals’ cost of providing care to Medicaid 
patients. Federal law then requires each state’s Medicaid program to make DSH 
payments to qualifying hospitals that serve a large number of Medicaid and uninsured 





2019). The Social Security Act sets two methods for a hospital to qualify as a DSH 
hospital. A hospital is designated as a DSH hospital in one of two ways: 
1) If a large urban hospital demonstrates more than 30% of their total net 
inpatient care revenues go towards providing indigent care3.   
 
2) If a hospital’s DSH Patient Percentage Equation exceeds 15% (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2020). See Appendix B for a full explanation 
of the DSH Patient Percent Equation. 
 
 
I chose to examine DSH hospitals because a majority of hospitals in North 
Carolina are classified as DSH providers. Around 70% of all hospitals in North Carolina 
are classified as DSH providers (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2020)4.  
 
Baseline Data and Identifying DSH Hospitals in North Carolina 
My research methodology employs a quantitative approach by using Medicaid 
data. The quantitative approach I used relied on available data from Medicare Hospital 
Cost Reports (MHCRs) from the fiscal years 2014 – 2015 and 2015 – 2016 (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2020). Any provider that receives Medicaid payments is 
required by law to submit an annual cost report to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (Centers for Medicaid and CHIP Services, 2020). MHCRs contain valuable data 
about all hospitals in North Carolina, such as facility characteristics, total costs, total 
revenues, uncompensated care costs, Medicaid charges, and other financial statement 
data (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2015). Next, I cross-referenced the 
MHCR data with a list of DSH locations released by the NC Department of Health and 
 
3 Indigent care is used to define care towards individuals who are uninsured and/or are not eligible for 
government health care coverage such as Medicaid or Medicare.  






Human Services (NC Medicaid Division of Health Benefits, 2019). Cross-referencing the 
data allowed me to identify and pull out information for only DSH providers.  
 
Forecasting Medicaid Enrollment in North Carolina after Work Requirements 
After considering the hospital financial data, I used four case studies to evaluate 
the impact of work requirements. The first case study examines how work requirements 
reduce program participation and benefits in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP). The study is relevant to my Medicaid research since both SNAP and 
Medicaid are means-tested programs. The results are helpful to estimate how Medicaid 
enrollment in North Carolina is impacted by work requirements (Ku, Brantley, & Pillai, 
2019). The second case study is from Kentucky, which forecasted how the state’s 
Medicaid population would lose coverage under the proposed work requirements law. 
Kentucky’s work requirement law has similar language as the proposed North Carolina 
law, and it projects the Medicaid population which will lose coverage under the law 
(Office of the Governor of Kentucky, 2017). These forecasts are helpful to estimate how 
Medicaid enrollment in North Carolina is impacted by work requirements. Both the third 
and fourth case studies contain results from Arkansas’ implementation of work 
requirements. The third case from the Arkansas Department of Human services 
calculated that 23% of beneficiaries lost coverage. For the fourth case, Sommers, 
Goldman, Blendon, Orav, and Epstein (2019), used surveys to estimate the impact of 
work requirements on Medicaid coverage and they found that around 13% of recipients 
lost coverage. Arkansas implemented Medicaid work requirements in 2015, and the 





requirements. Arkansas can be used as a case study due to the similar language and 
benefit structure of the work requirement laws as the proposed North Carolina law. 
Although the two laws are similar, the financial effects on hospitals in Arkansas can’t be 
directly imposed on hospitals in North Carolina because of differences in the number of 
DSH hospitals per state. In Arkansas, 5% of the hospitals in the state are classified as 
DSH as compared to 70% of hospitals in North Carolina (Medicaid and CHIP Payment 
and Access Commission, 2019). Since DSH providers serve a large number of Medicaid 
recipients and low-income individuals, it’s important to research the difference North 
Carolina hospitals could see as result of Medicaid work requirements.  
I believe examining these four case studies is important because it gives a more 
holistic view of how North Carolina Medicaid beneficiaries would be impacted by work 
requirements. I averaged the coverage losses from each study and found that 
implementation of work requirements, on average, leads to a 14% decrease in coverage. I 
use the 14 % average in my primary analysis and then run situational analyses to show 
how Medicaid in North Carolina would react under each scenario. For this thesis, I 
assume that all individuals who lose coverage move to uninsured status.  The four case 
studies, one from another means-tested program, one forecast, and two implementation 
studies from Arkansas, help me forecast different scenarios for North Carolina.  
The Medicare Hospital Cost Reports contains Medicaid patient data for each DSH 
provider in North Carolina, including discharges, revenues, and expenses. With these 
data sets and the results from the case studies, I forecasted the reduction in Medicaid 





to determine the effects on operating margins. Equation 1 shows the steps of how 
coverage loss is calculated.  
Equation 1: Calculating potential coverage loss 
1) Use the Medicare Hospital Cost Reports to determine the number of Medicaid 
discharges per hospital. 
 
2) Evaluate the number of Medicaid recipients subject to work requirements that 
would lose Medicaid coverage in N.C. based on the average coverage loss of 
the four case studies  
 
 
Since Medicaid work requirements are relatively new and data is still being 
collected on their effects, I decided to run a situational analysis to show how DSH 
providers reacted under different forecasts. I used the two Arkansas case studies to 
demonstrate how DSH providers would be affected, as well as the projections from 
Kentucky’s work requirements proposal. Examining different projections of the financial 
effects gives a more holistic view of how hospitals will react under different 
circumstances. The language laws from Arkansas and Kentucky are nearly identical to 
the language of the North Carolina law, making it easier to compare the states.  
 
Examining payer mix of DSH hospitals  
The steps outlined above are essential for me to understand the Medicaid 
coverage landscape in North Carolina if Medicaid work requirements were to take effect. 
I first calculated the change in payer mix by dividing Medicaid discharges by the total 
discharges after work requirements. I calculated payer mix to show how the proportion of 






Examining operating margins of DSH hospitals  
 After I determined the impact to payer at DSH providers, I examined how the 
coverage loss affects hospital performance in North Carolina. I hoped to determine DSH 
hospitals’ financial well-being by observing each hospitals’ operating margin before and 
after Medicaid work requirements are enacted. Operating margins is a measure routinely 
used by researchers and policymakers to measure hospital performance (Rhodes, 
Buchmueller, Levy, & Nikpay, 2019; Bai & Anderson, 2016). The following section 
outlines how I determined the operating margins for DSH providers.   
Operating Margin 
I focused on operating margin in this thesis because the operating margin is 
generated from hospitals’ core business and it is more comparable across hospitals than 
total profit. For my study, Hospital Operating Margin is defined as net income from 
patient care (i.e. patient services) divided by net patient revenue. Patient care includes 
revenues from hospitals’ inpatient, outpatient, and Medicaid-related services. Equation 1 
illustrates how operating margin will be calculated both before and after Medicaid work 
requirements: 






Total income from patient care was reduced by the total operating expenses for all 
patients, and then divided by net patient revenue to determine operating margin. An 
advantage of calculating the operating margin for hospitals rather than using just net 





Revenues and Costs 
 To calculate the operating margin for a hospital, I first calculated the changes in 
revenues and costs. Accounting for differences in coverage with work requirements in 
place, I determined hospitals’ costs and revenues from the hospital data obtained earlier. 
The data from CMS contains total revenues, net Medicaid revenues, operating costs, net 
Medicaid charges, and hospital discharges for Medicaid recipients. Total patient revenue 
is defined as the total amount of income generated from providing services to patients. 
Net Medicaid patient revenue is the total amount of income a hospital receives from the 
federal government from providing services to Medicaid patients, less the costs of 
providing service to those patients. Hospital operating expenses are the total expenses 
incurred by a hospital for providing services to patients, both Medicaid and non-
Medicaid. I used the following equation to calculate changes to revenues and costs: 
Revenues 
Equation 3: Revenue per Medicaid discharge 
 
!"#	%"&'()'&	*"+",-".
%"&'()'&	/'.(0)12".  = Average Medicaid Revenue per patient 
I calculate the Revenue per Medicaid discharge by dividing the net Medicaid revenues by 
the number of Medicaid discharges. I do this to determine the average revenue a hospital 
brings in per Medicaid discharge.  
Equation 4: Revenue per non-Medicaid discharge 
 
!"#	3)#'",#	*"+",-".4%"&'()'&	*"+",-".
56#)7	/'.(0)12".4%"&'()'&	/'.(0)12".  = Average non-Medicaid revenue per discharge 
To find the average revenue per non-Medicaid patient discharge, I deducted Medicaid 





discharges. I do this to determine the average revenue a hospital brings in per non-
Medicaid discharge.  
Equation 5: Hospital Revenues after Medicaid work requirements 
("#$%&'%$	)%*&ℎ',-#*	(./)	1	/#2#34#	5#,	"#$%&'%$	5'6%#36) + 
(7896':	)%*&&ℎ',-#*	(./) − 	"#$%&'%$	)%*&ℎ',-#*	(./)<	1	/#2#34#	5#,	$%*&ℎ',-# = 
Total Hospital Revenue 
 
Costs 
Equation 6: Operating Expense per discharge 
 
89"1)#',2	:;9",.".
56#)7	/'.(0)12".  = Average Operating Expense per discharge 
 
I calculate the Operating Expense per discharge by dividing the total Operating Expenses 
by the total number of discharges. By doing this, I am able to see the average operating 
expense it costs to treat each patient.  









Examining uncompensated care costs of DSH hospitals 	
Uncompensated Care Costs 
 Uncompensated care costs are services provided by hospitals that do not get 
reimbursed (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2020). Uncompensated care 
costs arise when patients do not have insurance or cannot afford the cost of medical care. 
There are two types of uncompensated care: 
• Charity care: the hospital does not charge the patient at all, or charges the patient 
at a discounted rate below the hospital’s cost of delivering care 
 
• Bad Debt: the hospital charges the patient but is not able to collect payment 
 
 
Uncompensated care is the sum of charity care and bad debt. Since hospitals vary in their 
policies regarding charity care, there is no clear distinction between charity care and bad 
debt (Rhodes, Buchmueller, Levy, & Nikpay, 2019). Therefore, in this thesis, I analyze 
uncompensated care as a combined measure rather than each component. I also measure 
uncompensated care costs as a percent of operating expenses since uncompensated care is 
a measure of forgone revenue. Measuring uncompensated care as a percent of a hospital’s 
operating expenses is common in this area of research (Rhodes, Buchmueller, Levy, & 
Nikpay, 2019; Garcia, Thompson, Howard, & Pink, 2018).  
 For my honors thesis, unlike other research, I kept uncompensated costs separate 
from operating margins in my analysis. Scholars commonly factor in uncompensated care 
costs to total operating expenses although hospitals categorize these two costs separately 
(Haught, Dobson, & Luu, 2019; Rhodes, Buchmueller, Levy, & Nikpay, 2019; 
Lindrooth, Perraillon, Hardy, & Tung, 2018). I do not factor uncompensated care costs 
into total operating costs nor operating margins because uncompensated costs are not 





programs, such as DSH payments or CHIP, to offset these costs. Factoring 
uncompensated care costs into the operating expenses and operating margins, overstates 
the cost of providing care, and thereby overstates both measures. I decided to measure 
operating margins and uncompensated care costs separately because it gives a more 
holistic view of how work requirements would affect different parts of hospitals’ 
financials.  




A full list of equations and assumptions can be found in Appendix D.  
 
Limitations 
 My study is not without its limitations, and I anticipate a few of them with my 
proposed methodology. One limitation of this study is that this is a projection. Since 
North Carolina has not yet implemented Medicaid work requirements, there is no 
definitive number of how Medicaid enrollment will change. The actual enrollment 
change could be higher or lower than the average I use in my methodology. Since I am 
forecasting how North Carolina hospitals would react, I cannot assert causality. I plan to 
incorporate a situational analysis of high and low estimates based on the case studies to 
get a better view of how work requirements impact hospitals (Appendix D).  
The second limitation is the data from the Medicare Hospital Cost Reports. 
Although this public data is commonly used by scholars, researchers, and government 
agencies, the data is known to have some quality problems. Several hospitals in the cost 





response. I had to remove 10% of all DSH providers from the pool due to nonresponse, 
which reduced the sample size and limited the generalizability to North Carolina 
hospitals. The third limitation, also stemming from data, is that my analyses were cross-
sectional, limited to a window of 2 years. I only analyzed two years of data because that 
was easily available to me, but that might not capture the whole picture of a hospital’s 
financial standings. A hard or successful financial year for a hospital may have been an 
anomaly in one of the two fiscal years, which could have led me to drop hospitals from 
the data set. Furthermore, a hospital could have been categorized as being a DSH 
provider in the window I was examining due to high Medicaid volume, but the years 







 In this section, I hope to provide a high-level analysis of how work requirements 
impact hospitals’ payer mix, operating margins, and uncompensated care costs. The 
analysis explores fiscal years 2014 – 2015 and 2015 – 2016, to understand how financials 
change as work requirements are imposed.  
 Prior to my analysis, I omitted all hospitals in North Carolina that the state did not 
identify as DSH providers. From the 2014 – 2015 DSH list, I dropped 10 DSH designated 
hospitals because they had missing values that were critical for the analysis (e.g. Net 
Revenue from Medicaid). Additionally, I removed 2 observations in which operating 
margins had absolute values of 100% or greater. I removed the same number of 
observations for the same reasons from the 2015 – 2016 DSH list. After removing these 













Fiscal Year 2014-2015 
 The first year of data I examined was from 2014 – 2015. This results subsection 
shows the overall payer mix, operating margins, and uncompensated care costs before 
and after Medicaid work requirements.  
 
Payer mix before Medicaid work requirements 
 I calculated the payer fix for hospitals from this financial year by dividing the 
total number of Medicaid discharges by the total number of hospital discharges. I then 
averaged the 88 hospitals’ payer mixes to find the average payer mix at hospitals before 
work requirements. As shown in the Figure 1 below, on average, 21 % of hospital 
discharges are Medicaid patients, 40% are Medicare patients, and 39% are neither. For 
the purposes of this study, 21% of hospital discharges are Medicaid patients and 79% are 
non-Medicaid patients.  
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Payer mix after Medicaid work requirements 
I then calculated the impact work requirements would have on the number of 
Medicaid discharges at hospitals. I repeated the steps above and divided the number of 
Medicaid discharges with Medicaid work requirements by the total number of hospital 
discharges after work requirements. Figure 2 below shows the average payer mix at 
hospitals after Medicaid work requirements are implemented. After work requirements, 
19 % of hospital discharges are Medicaid patients, 39% are Medicare patients, and 40% 
are neither. Medicaid patient discharges are 19% of the payer mix and non-Medicaid 
patient discharges are 81%. After Medicaid work requirements, Medicaid discharges 
decreased by 2% and discharges of non-Medicaid patients increased by 2%.  
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Operating Margins  
Revenues before Medicaid work requirements 
I calculated the percent of hospital revenue per patient type by dividing Net 
Medicaid Revenue by the Net Patient Revenue. I then averaged the 88 hospitals’ payer 
mixes to find the average percent of hospitals revenues by patient type before work 
requirements. Figure 3 below shows that 8% of a hospital’s revenues comes from 
Medicaid patients and 92% of revenues  
come from all other patients.  
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Revenues after Medicaid work requirements 
I then calculated the impact work requirements would have on the percent of 
hospital revenue per patient. In Figure 4 below, the percent of hospital revenues 
generated per patient type are shown. After work requirements, 7% of a hospital’s 
revenues comes from Medicaid patients and 93% of revenues come from all other 
patients. With work requirements in place, the percent of hospital revenue that comes 
from Medicaid patients decreases by 1%. Figures 5 and 6 show hospitals’ average net 
Medicaid revenue and average total revenue before and after Medicaid work 
requirements. Net Medicaid Revenue decreases by 14% after work requirements, as 
shown in Figure 5 below. Average total revenues for hospitals decreased by 1.17% with 
work requirements in place, as displayed in Figure 6.  
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Costs before and after Medicaid work requirements 
After I calculated the revenues for hospitals, I analyzed the operating expenses. In 
Figure 7 below, I show the change in operating expenses before and after Medicaid work 
requirements. Operating expenses decreased from around $240 million to $232 million, 
or a 3.05% decrease in expenses.  
 






































































Overall Effects on Operating Margins 
I show revenues and costs above to show how each component factors into 
hospital operating margins. Before work requirements the average operating margins for 
hospitals in North Carolina was -0.15%. After work requirements, operating margins 
increase to 1.66%, an average increase of 1.81 percentage points. Figure 8 displays the 
changes in operating margins with Medicaid work requirements in place.  
 









































Uncompensated Care Costs before and after Medicaid work requirements 
 First, I calculated the raw uncompensated care costs for hospitals. Figure 9 below 
shows uncompensated care costs before and after Medicaid work requirements. 
Uncompensated care increased 40.26% from around $18 million per hospital to over $25 
million after work requirements. Additionally, I calculated uncompensated care costs for 
hospitals as a percent of total operating expenses. As mentioned in the methodology 
section, measuring uncompensated care costs against total operating costs is a common 
measure in this area of research. I show the change in the percentage of uncompensated 
care costs as a percent of total operating expenses in Figure 11 below. Figure 11 shows 
uncompensated care costs as percent of total operating expenses increases by 3.38 
percentage points from 9.45% to 12.83%.  
 
















































































Fiscal Year 2015-2016 
 The second year of data I examined was from 2015 – 2016. This results 
subsection shows the overall payer mix, operating margins, and uncompensated care 
costs before and after Medicaid work requirements.  
 
Payer mix before Medicaid work requirements 
 I calculated the payer mix for hospitals in fiscal year 2015 – 2016 using the same 
steps as from fiscal year 2014 – 2015. Figure 12 shows that across hospitals, an average 
of 22% of hospital discharges are Medicaid patients, 40% are Medicare patients, and 38% 
are neither. Conclusively, 22% of hospital discharges are Medicaid patients and 78% are 
non-Medicaid patients.  
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Payer mix after Medicaid work requirements 
I then calculated the impact work requirements would have on the number of 
Medicaid discharges at hospitals. Figure 13 below shows the average payer mix at 
hospitals after Medicaid work requirements are implemented. After work requirements, 
20 % of hospital discharges are Medicaid patients, 41% are Medicare patients, and 39% 
are neither. Medicaid patient discharges are 20% of the payer mix and non-Medicaid 
patient discharges are 80%. In fiscal year 2015 – 2016, the same as in 2014 – 2015, 
Medicaid discharges decreased by 2% and discharges of non-Medicaid patients increased 
by 2%.  
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Operating Margins  
Revenues before Medicaid work requirements 
I calculated the percent of hospital revenue per patient type by dividing Net 
Medicaid Revenue by the Net Patient Revenue. I then averaged the 88 hospitals’ payer 
mixes to find the average percent of hospitals revenues by patient type before work 
requirements. Figure 14 below shows that 8% of a hospital’s revenues comes from 
Medicaid patients and 92% of revenues  
come from all other patients, similar to the previous fiscal year.  
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Revenues after Medicaid work requirements 
I then calculated the impact work requirements would have on the percent of 
hospital revenue per patient. In Figure 15 below, the percent of hospital revenues 
generated per patient type are shown. After work requirements, 7% of a hospital’s 
revenues comes from Medicaid patients and 93% of revenues come from all other 
patients. With work requirements in place, the percent of hospital revenue that comes 
from Medicaid patients decreases by 1%. Figures 16 and Figure 17 show hospitals’ 
average net Medicaid revenue and average total revenue before and after Medicaid work 
requirements. Net Medicaid Revenue decreases by 14% after work requirements, as 
shown in Figure 16 below. Average total revenues for hospitals decreased by 1.15% with 
work requirements in place, as displayed in Figure 17.  
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Costs before and after Medicaid work requirements 
After I calculated the revenues for hospitals, I analyzed the operating expenses. In 
Figure 18 below, I show the change in operating expenses before and after Medicaid 
work requirements. Operating expenses decreased from around $255 million to $247 
million, or a 3.27% decrease in expenses.  
 







































Overall Effects on Operating Margins 
I show revenues and costs above to show how each component factors into 
hospital operating margins. Before work requirements the average operating margins for 
hospitals in North Carolina was -1.61%. After work requirements, operating margins 
increase to 3.60%, an average increase of 1.99 percentage points. Figure 19 displays the 
changes in operating margins with Medicaid work requirements in place.  
 









































Uncompensated Care Costs before and after Medicaid work requirements 
 First, I calculated the raw uncompensated care costs for hospitals. Figure 9 below 
shows uncompensated care costs before and after Medicaid work requirements. 
Uncompensated care increased 50.43% from around $16 million per hospital to over $24 
million after work requirements. Additionally, I calculated uncompensated care costs for 
hospitals as a percent of total operating expenses. As mentioned in the methodology 
section, measuring uncompensated care costs against total operating costs is a common 
measure in this area of research. I show the change in the percentage of uncompensated 
care costs as a percent of total operating expenses in Figure 20 below. Figure 20 shows 
uncompensated care costs as percent of total operating expenses increases by 3.27 
percentage points from 8.71% to 11.98%.  
 












































Cost of uncomensated care as operating % patient
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In this section, I discuss the key implications of the results from my study. I 
divide up the discussion section by the three main areas of analysis: payer mix, operating 
margins, and uncompensated care costs. I also explore some of the limitations of my 
research in the following section. The situational analysis in Appendix C shows how 
DSH providers could react under different circumstances.  
 
Effects on Payer Mix at Hospitals  
 Based on the results from the 2014 – 2015 and 2015 – 2016 fiscal years, the payer 
mix shifted with the introduction of work requirements. In both years, the percentage of 
Medicaid discharges per hospital decreased by 2%, and the percentage of non-Medicaid 
discharges increased by 2%. Research from Medicaid expansion suggested that 
expansion increased the proportion of patients with Medicaid coverage and decreased the 
proportion of patients with private insurance (Admon, et al., 2019; Wu, et al., 2018; 
Nikpay, Buchmueller, & Levy, 2016). My findings suggest that Medicaid work 
requirements would results in changes in payer mix for DSH hospitals, with reductions in 
payers covered by Medicaid and increases in patients with no expected source of 
payment. The total volume of hospitals appears to decrease as patients are ‘crowded-out’ 






Effects on Hospital Operating Margins 
Effects on Revenues  
 The findings from this study suggest that for DSH providers, Medicaid work 
requirements reduce revenue because patients who lost their Medicaid coverage will no 
longer have their services reimbursed by Medicaid. Medicaid revenues appear to be hit 
the hardest by the implementation of work requirements, with hospitals seeing an average 
of a 14% decrease in Medicaid revenues. The data implies that total net patient revenues 
decrease between 1.15 and 1.17 percentage points as a result of the reduction in Medicaid 
revenues. Findings from current work requirements research suggest that Medicaid 
revenues at hospitals fall by 10 to 11% (Haught, Dobson, & Luu, 2019). My research 
agrees with previous studies, and it suggests that hospitals’ Medicaid and total revenues 
decrease as a result of the decrease in Medicaid patients and an increase in uninsured 
patients.  
Effects on Expenses 
Similar to revenues, the study indicates that costs for DSH are reduced after 
Medicaid work requirements by between 3.05% and 3.27%. Costs for providing service 
to Medicaid patients and non-Medicaid patients remained the same with work 
requirements in place. This study suggests that the payer shift moving away from 
Medicaid patients decreases a hospital’s operating expenses because there are fewer 






Overall Effects on Operating Margins 
Overall, operating margins appear to increase as a result of Medicaid work 
requirements because the decrease in operating expenses is greater than the decrease in 
revenues. The data in my study shows that Medicaid patients bring in less revenue per 
discharge than non-Medicaid patients, and it appears that Medicaid patients’ costs exceed 
the reimbursement rates. Therefore, a reduction in the number of these patients will 
increase the overall margins. The results suggest that hospital operating margins improve 
because the costs of treating Medicaid patients are greater than the revenues they 
generate.  
 
Hospital Uncompensated Care Costs 
My analysis suggests that uncompensated costs will increase if Medicaid work 
requirements are implemented. The total uncompensated care costs increased by 40.26% 
and 50.43% in fiscal years 2014 – 2015 and 2015 – 2016, respectively. These increases 
translate to a 3.38 and a 3.27 percentage point increase in uncompensated care costs as a 
percent of total operating expenses. Not only do uncompensated care costs increase after 
work requirements, but they also become a more significant part of total operating 
expenses for hospitals. Increases in uncompensated care appear to be affected by shifts in 
payer mix. Individuals that are moved from Medicaid to uninsured status, so those 
patients are no longer able to cover their hospital care expenses. Hospitals are required by 
law to provide care to patients, regardless of insurance status, and those care expenses are 





increase in uninsured patients, hospitals’ uncompensated care costs increase since 
Medicaid no longer reimburses patients costs.  
 
Discussion Conclusion 
 The results of my research suggest that work requirements could decrease the 
Medicaid payer mix by 2% at hospitals, increase operating margins between 1.8% and 
2.0%, and increase uncompensated care costs between 3.3% and 3.4%.The results 
indicate that while hospital margins could improve with work requirements, the increases 







In the introduction of this thesis, I wrote about North Carolina’s proposed 
Medicaid work requirements law and its approval by CMS. I also introduced my goals 
for this thesis, which were to show that Medicaid work requirements have impacts just 
beyond Medicaid coverage. Then, in the literature review, I discussed the background of 
the Medicaid program and research on the effects of Medicaid expansion on state 
economies, coverage rates, labor participation, and hospital finances. I also walked 
through the current, but limited, research on the effects of work requirements on means-
tested programs and how my research could contribute to the conversation about 
Medicaid work requirements. In the methodology section, I outlined my questions, 
hypotheses, and the steps I used to analyze both. Finally, in the results and discussion 
sections, I examined fiscal years 2014 – 2015 and 2015 – 2016 and the effect work 
requirements could impose on hospitals’ payer mixes, operating margins, and 
uncompensated care costs. My findings suggest the following if Medicaid work 
requirements are implemented in North Carolina: Hospital payer mixes shift away from 
Medicaid patients towards non-Medicaid payers, Operating Margins increase, and 
Uncompensated Care Costs increase. To conclude this paper, I identify future areas of 
research for this topic.  
The use of this forecast can be useful, but only under certain circumstances. The 
goal of a forecast is to predict what might happen under a given set of conditions. It is 
important to understand North Carolina’s uniqueness as a state, in terms of Medicaid 
population, DSH providers, and law language. Just because the forecast created here 





not mean that other states will behave in lockstep. The impact on payer mix, operating 
margins, and uncompensated care costs at hospitals in other states depends on the 
characteristics of the states, hospitals, and the design of state’ Medicaid work requirement 
programs. All of these mentioned play a key role in how many recipients lose coverage 
and the resulting financial impact that would have on hospitals.  
While the forecasts for North Carolina show work requirements shift the payer 
mix away from Medicaid patients, increase operating margins, and increase 
uncompensated care costs, there are still many questions we can ask on the relationship 
between work requirements and hospital finances. I would expand on this research asking 
how Medicaid work requirements impact Critical Access Hospitals. Critical Access 
Hospitals designation helps rural hospitals reduce their financial vulnerability and 
improve access to healthcare in rural communities. It would be interesting to examine this 
subset of hospitals in North Carolina and how Medicaid work requirements could impact 
them. Another question to ask would be how all North Carolina hospitals would respond 
to the implementation of requirements. The adoption of North Carolina’s Medicaid work 
requirements appears to be in the near future, possibly within a year. If these work 
requirements were to pass, it would be worthwhile to turn these forecasts into a case 
study. I think it would be interesting to explore the actual results from Medicaid work 
requirements, if implemented, to see their impact on hospitals. The implementation in 
North Carolina and the design of the program could end up being different from 
Arkansas, so I would be curious to investigate how the implementation would affect the 





the relationship between work requirements and hospital closures in Arkansas, the first 
state that implemented these requirements.  
I hope this thesis contributes to additional lines of questioning in the Medicaid 
work requirements area and inspires future research questions that expand on this 
research and the current literature. Lawmakers in states considering Medicaid work 
requirements should consider these findings and the downstream effects work 












Table 1: Medicaid for Aged, Blind, and Disabled 
 
 
Table 2: Medicaid for Infants and Children 
Family Size Age 0-5 Age 6-18 
1 $2125 $1346 
2 $2881 $1825 
3 $3637 $2304 
4 $4393 $2782 
5 $5149 $3261 
 
 
Table 3: Medicaid for Families with Dependent Children 







Family Size 1 2 





Table 4: Medicaid for Pregnant Women 







Table 5: States Decisions on ACA Expansion 
Location Status of Medicaid Expansion Decision 
United States 37 expansion states including 
Washington D.C 
14 Non-adoption states 






District of Columbia Adopted 
Florida Not Adopted 


















Mississippi Not Adopted 




New Hampshire Adopted 
New Jersey Adopted 
New Mexico Adopted 
New York Adopted 
North Carolina Not Adopted 






Oklahoma Not Adopted 
Oregon Adopted 
Pennsylvania Adopted 
Rhode Island Adopted 
South Carolina Not Adopted 
South Dakota Not Adopted 
Tennessee Not Adopted 





West Virginia Adopted 
Wisconsin Not Adopted 
Wyoming Not Adopted 







1. First Method  
Qualifying for the alternate special exception Medicare DSH adjustment applies to 
hospitals meeting all the following:  
• Located in an urban area  
• Have 100 or more beds  
• Can demonstrate more than 30 percent of their total net inpatient care revenues 
come from state and local government sources for indigent care (other than 
Medicare or Medicaid)  
These hospitals are known as “Pickle” hospitals. If a hospital qualifies under this 
method, it is eligible for a specific Medicare DSH adjustment.  
 
2. Alternate Special Exception Method  
The primary method applies to hospitals serving a significantly disproportionate number 
of low-income patients, based on the hospital’s disproportionate patient percentage 
(DPP).  
The DPP equals the sum of the percentage of Medicare inpatient days (including 
Medicare Advantage inpatient days) attributable to patients entitled to both Medicare Part 
A and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) (including patient days not covered under 
Part A and patient days when patients exhaust their Part A benefits), and the percentage 
of total inpatient days attributable to patients eligible for Medicaid but not entitled to 
Medicare Part A.  
If a hospital’s DPP equals or exceeds a specified threshold amount, the hospital qualifies 
for the Medicare DSH adjustment. The Medicare DSH adjustment is determined by using 
a complex formula (the applicable formula is based on a hospital’s DPP).  







Table 6: Table of Data and Assumptions 
 
Variable Source Equations / Assumptions 
1) Payer Mix (before 
work requirements) 
From Cost Reports: total Medicaid 
discharges and total discharges 
Medicaid discharges / total discharges 
Assumption: all Medicaid beneficiaries who lose 
coverage move to uninsured status 
2) Medicaid discharges 
(after work requirements) 
From Cost Reports: total Medicaid 
discharges  
 
Medicaid discharges – (Medicaid Discharges * 
percent of beneficiaries that lose coverage) 
 
**Percent of beneficiaries that lose coverage is 
taken from the case studies (3%, 13%, 15%, 25%) 
3) Total Discharges (after 
work requirements) 
From Cost Reports: total Medicaid 
discharges and total discharges 
Total discharges – (Medicaid discharges – 
Medicaid discharges after work requirements) 
4) Payer Mix (after work 
requirements) 
total discharges after work 
requirements (#3) 
 
Medicaid discharges with work requirements / 
total discharges 
Assumption: all Medicaid beneficiaries who lose 
coverage move to uninsured status 
5) Net Revenue From Cost Reports: Net Revenue  
6) Medicaid Revenue From Cost Reports: Net Revenue 
from Medicaid  
 
7) Revenue per Medicaid 
discharges 
From Cost Reports: Medicaid 
revenue and Medicaid discharges 
Medicaid revenue / Medicaid discharges 
8) Revenue per discharge From Cost Reports: total revenue 
and total discharges 
Total revenue / total discharges 
 
9) Net Revenue (after 
work requirements) 
Medicaid discharges after work 
requirements (#2), total discharges 
after work requirements (#3), and 
revenues from discharges (#7&8) 
(Medicaid discharges after work requirements 
*revenue per Medicaid discharge) + ((total 
discharges after Medicaid – Medicaid discharges 
after work requirements) * revenue from other 
discharges) 
10) Medicaid Revenue 
(after work requirements) 
Medicaid discharges (#2) and 
revenue per discharge (#8) 
(Medicaid discharges after work requirements 
*revenue per Medicaid discharge) 
11) Operating Costs From Cost Reports: Total 
Operating Expenses 
 
12) Cost per discharge Operating Expenses and Total 
Discharges 
Operating Expenses / Discharges 
13) Operating Margins From Cost Reports (Net Patient Revenue – Operating Expenses) / Net 
Patient Revenue 
14) Operating Margins 
after work requirements 
From calculations  (Net Patient Revenue – Operating Expenses) / Net 
Patient Revenue 
15) Uncompensated Care 
Costs (after work 
requirements) 
From Cost Reports: 
Uncompensated Care Costs 
(Operating Expense per patient discharge *(total 
discharges – discharges after work requirements)) 







Appendix D: Situational Analyses 
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Net Patient Revenues
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Change in Operating Margins








































SNAP Arkansas 1 Average Kentucky Arkansas 2
Uncompensated Care Costs
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SNAP Arkansas 1 Average Kentucky Arkansas 2
Uncompensated Care Costs as a % of Total Operating Expenses
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Fiscal Year 2015 – 2016 
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SNAP Arkansas 1 Average Kentucky Arkansas 2
Uncompensated Care Costs as a % of Total Operating Expenses
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